Designated Original

July 31, 2006

L-PI-06-064
10 CFR 50.73

U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1
Docket 50-282
License No. DPR-42

LER 1-06-01, Unit 1 Reactor Trip, Supplement 1

Supplement 1 to the Licensee Event Report (LER) for this occurrence is attached. Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) notified the NRC of this event, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), on April 14, 2006. The original LER was submitted on June 13, 2006. This supplement incorporates the results of NMC's root cause evaluation of this event. Please contact us if you require additional information related to this event.

Summary of Commitments

This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments. This letter completes the commitment made in the original LER to submit a supplement to this LER after the associated root cause evaluation was completed.

Thomas J. Palmisano
Site Vice President, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Enclosure

cc: Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Prairie Island, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Prairie Island, USNRC
Glenn Wilson, State of Minnesota

IE22 Rec'd 12/4/06
M. Chawla

ENCLOSURE

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-06-01, Supplement 1

3 pages follow

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(6-2004)

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2007

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0066), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1	05000 282	1 of 3

TITLE (4)

Unit 1 Reactor Trip

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
4	14	06	06	-- 01 --	1	7	31	06	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	1
POWER LEVEL (10)	100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)

20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
20.2201(d)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
20.2203(a)(1)	50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	73.71(a)(4)
20.2203(a)(2)(i)	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(5)
20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.46(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	
20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	
20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Jeff Kivi	651.388.1121

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
Aging	SD	MO	I075	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO				

ABSTRACT

On April 14, 2006, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. At approximately 1425 CDT, an 11 FEEDWATER PUMP LOCKED OUT annunciator was received in the control room. Unit 1 operators responded per the alarm response procedure and manually tripped the reactor. The trip was uncomplicated and all systems operated as expected and operator response and recovery actions were as expected.

Initial investigation of the cause of the 11 Feedwater Pump trip determined the feedwater pump tripped because the 11 Condensate Pump had tripped. The 11 Condensate Pump motor was shipped off site for repairs and the stator windings were found to have grounded. The root cause evaluation (RCE) of this event determined the condensate pump trip was caused by degraded motor insulation due to aging and environmental conditions. The RCE further determined that the organizational root cause of the condensate pump motor trip was a lack of an adequate long range planning and budgeting process to prioritize and budget large motor maintenance.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On April 14, 2006, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. At approximately 1425 CDT, an 11 FEEDWATER[1] PUMP[2] LOCKED OUT annunciator was received in the control room. Unit 1 operators responded per the alarm response procedure and manually tripped the reactor. The auxiliary feedwater[3] pumps started automatically in response to the low narrow range steam generator level, which was caused by shrink resulting from the reactor trip. The trip was uncomplicated and all systems operated as expected and operator response and recovery actions were as expected.

EVENT ANALYSIS

The trip of the Unit 1 reactor and the actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system are required to be reported per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

Impact on Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator

The affected condensate and feedwater pumps have no active safety function. All other systems performed as expected during the event. Therefore, this event does not represent a loss of safety function. Consequently, this event is not reportable per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 after the trip with all systems performing as expected in response to the reactor trip. Therefore, this event did not affect the health and safety of the public.

CAUSE

Initial investigation of the cause of the 11 Feedwater Pump trip determined the feedwater pump tripped because the 11 Condensate Pump had tripped. Troubleshooting identified the cause of the condensate pump trip to be a ground between the 11 Condensate[4] Pump and Bus 13. The condensate pump motor was determinated and a zero ohm ground was measured on the motor. The motor was shipped off site for repairs and the stator windings were found to have grounded.

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[1] EIIS System Code: SJ
[2] EIIS Component Identifier: P
[3] EIIS System Code: BA
[4] EIIS System Code: SD

NMC conducted a root cause evaluation (RCE) and determined that the equipment cause of the condensate pump motor trip was degraded motor insulation due to aging and environmental conditions. The RCE further determined that the organizational root cause of the condensate pump motor trip was a lack of an adequate long range planning and budgeting process to prioritize and budget large motor maintenance.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Interim Actions:

1. NMC performed a baseline off-line monitoring for Unit 1 large balance of plant motors in the May 2006 (1R24) refueling outage. All data was in acceptable ranges.

Planned Actions:

2. Rewind all Unit 1 and Unit 2 condensate pump motors with Class F insulation.

3. Develop a Large Motor Plan for Prairie Island that includes frequency and scope of testing, preventative maintenance and frequency of major maintenance activities.

4. Revise long range plan and budgets to include major maintenance activities.

5. Investigate trip logic for the condensate pumps to determine the feasibility of modifying the logic to prevent a unit trip following a condensate pump trip.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 have experienced unplanned reactor trips in the past, however, the most recent unplanned reactor trip of either unit occurred in 2002.